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Sub-Saharan Africa is the most recent hot spot of a modern wave of terrorism. Violent conflicts, 
riots, uprisings, genocide, wars, 
insurgency and even terrorism are not 
recent phenomena in Africa. However, 
terrorism has emerged and occupies 
a dominant position among security 
concerns of African states more than 
ever before. Beyond the post-9/11 
global mobilisation against terrorism by 
the USA, this phenomenon has in itself 
come of age in Africa. There are many 
extremist groups in Africa that are now 
queuing into the global trend of terrorist 
operations and strategies. Africa is 
witnessing a remarkable shift in terrorist 
practices, with growing flexibility 
of organisations, constituencies 
and support systems that reflect 
interconnectivity of global, regional 
and local theatres. These include a 
‘glocalised’ radicalism, business-like 
organisation, diversified sources of 
ammunition, finance and training.  
The recently celebrated economic 
growth and progress toward 
democracy in many African states 
have continued to be viewed with 
caution because of the fragility of many 
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AFRICA
states, mass poverty, corruption, bad 
governance, political instability and 
signs of resource curse among other 
things. In the age of modern terrorism, 
Africa is witnessing the modernisation 
of old strategies, transformation of old 
struggles, redefinition of old grievances 
and re-evaluation of old crimes. 
The effects of modernisation and 
‘glocalisation’ of terrorist operatives, 
tactics and strategies in Africa vary 
across countries and sub-regions, as 
there are also variations in the nature 
of struggle. 
The growth of religious-motivated 
terrorism in Africa has become identified 
with special strategic concerns. The 
praxis of sacred extremism and 
predominance of terrorists motivated 
by religious ideas across the world is 
reflected in some ways in Africa. Political 
order has been savaged in many African 
states with the subversive activities 
of Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa 
and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) in partnership with the former’s 
global network. In a similar way, Boko 
Haram’s campaigns of terror in Nigeria 
and the Lake Chad region have become 
a serious concern. In the light of this, 
politicians, strategists, social researchers 
and stakeholders within and outside the 
continent of Africa are confronted with 
how to counter this expanding frontier 
of terrorism. Against this backdrop, this 
article unpacks Boko Haram’s theatres 
of terrorism, Nigeria’s counterterrorism 
measures, its allies’ responses and the 
way forward.
Boko Haram: The Idea and the 
Struggle
On 14 April 2014, members of 
the Boko Haram group attacked 
and abducted 250 girls from the 
Government Secondary School in 
Chibok, North Eastern part of Nigeria. 
This tragic event generated a great deal 
of attention in Nigeria and the world. 
Boko Haram has carried out a series 
of assassinations, bombings, maimings, 
hostage takings, kidnappings, and 
uprisings. This group has killed more 
than 7000 people in over 1000 
different attacks in Nigeria and beyond. 
Among high profile attacks by 
Boko Haram are the Nigerian Police 
Headquarters and the United Nations 
office bombings in Abuja. The 
abduction of the wife of the Deputy 
Prime Minister of Cameroon, French 
tourists and expatriates in both 
Nigeria and Cameroon brought their 
activities into the limelight at the 
global level. The predominant targets 
of attacks include the police and the 
military, traditional rulers, educational 
institutions, critical clerics and places of 
worship, media houses and reporters 
and politicians. 
Beyond Nigeria, members of Boko 
Haram played an important role in 
the secession and defence of the 
defunct Islamic Republic of Azaward 
in Mali. This group has also carried 
out transnational acts of terror in 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while the 
operational presence of its members 
has also been reported in Somalia, 
Central Africa Republic, Libya and 
Mauritania; and it is reported to be 
connected to, and supported by or 
benefiting from international terrorist 
networks that included Al Shabaab 
in the Horn of Africa, Al Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Boko Haram, meaning “western 
education is a sin”, is the popular name 
for the group that calls itself Jama’atu 
Ahlis Suna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, 
meaning “people committed to the 
propagation of the prophet’s teachings 
and jihad”. Its goals have become a 
source of debate in recent times. Its 
leadership has been identified with 
many declarations and demands 
that have brought a lot of confusion 
in relation to the understanding of 
their struggle. However, the most 
commonly declared and easiest to 
identify goal of the group is to establish 
a theocratic Islamic state in Nigeria. 
Other common points of rally for the 
group include the development of 
the northern region of the country, 
enthronement of a Muslim from the 
northern region as Nigerian President, 
good governance, transparency, 
employment opportunities and puritan 
fellowship among Muslims. 
The phraseological relevance of 
Boko Haram as a name is premised 
on the idea that Western education 
disorients people from understanding 
God’s purpose for humanity. Any 
struggle to uphold the idea of God’s 
sovereignty, and subject fellow 
human beings under His outlined 
precepts, cannot avoid a clash with 
some scientific premises of Western 
teachings.  In line with these ideas 
Boko Haram launched many attacks 
on schools, particularly the institutions 
of higher learning, and killed many 
teachers. The abduction of 250 school 
girls scheduled to write Physics at 
the West Africa Examination Council 
(WAEC), a terminal examination for 
senior secondary school students in 
the region, was consistent with this. 
The group’s target is to reduce, if 
not to stop enrolments into Western 
education, which is seen as a rival to 
Islamic education. 
A previous survey has revealed that 
Boko Haram evolved from the Shabaab 
Muslim Youth Organisation founded 
in 1995.1 Boko Haram emerged from 
a series of fractionalisations of this 
group.  Under numerous names and 
labels between 1999 and 2004, the 
group was first noticed as the Nigerian 
Taliban in its December 2003 attack 
in Yobe state of Nigeria. A series of 
covert attacks among other operations 
was also credited this group between 
2003 and 2009. In July 2009, Boko 
Haram led a five days uprising against 
the Nigerian government in the north-
eastern region of the country.2 This 
uprising led to the death of its leader, 
Yusuf Muhammed, among some 800 
people killed.
Ever since 2010, the north-eastern 
part of Nigeria and the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT) have witnessed a 
series of attacks perpetrated by this 
movement. But Nigeria is not the only 
victim of the expanding Boko Haram 
terrorism. Cameroon, Niger, Mali and 
The predominant 
targets of attacks 
include the police and 
the military, traditional 
rulers, educational 
institutions, critical 
clerics and places of 
worship, media houses 
and reporters and 
politicians.
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Chad also share the burden of their 
terror attacks. The ideological reason 
behind the fractionalisation of Boko 
Haram in January 2012, as stated 
by the leadership of Boko Haram’s 
breakaway faction, Ansaru, is the fact 
that the former is timid about the 
internationalisation of their struggle. 
Due to this internal tussle among other 
things, Boko Haram has maintained 
constant criticism of the United States, 
Britain, France and Israel among other 
Western nations. The breakaway 
faction identified as Jama’atu Ansarul 
Musilimina fi Biladin Sudan (Ansaru), 
meaning Supporters of Islam in the 
Land of Black Africa, has declared a 
continental Jihad on all governments 
in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria as its 
kickoff point. 
Ansaru has attracted attention for the 
series of attacks against international 
symbolic targets such as the heritage 
library in Timbuktu and the kidnapping 
of foreigners in Nigeria. Recent 
intelligence reports have revealed that 
Ansaru and Boko Haram have resolved 
their differences and have resumed 
consultations and joint operations. 
Boko Haram is a typical example 
of the modernisation of old strategies, 
transformation of old struggles, 
redefinition of old grievances and 
the re-evaluation of old crime in 
Africa. Sharia advocacy and violence 
committed by Islamists are not recent 
in Nigeria. Maitasine preaching and 
violence in the northern part of Nigeria 
centred on similar motivations as Boko 
Haram. The Maitasine uprising in Kano 
and other parts of the northern region 
in the early 1980s claimed about 5000 
lives. 
Beyond this, there have always been 
different radical youth organisations 
that believed in using violence to 
establish an Islamic state in the country3 
The Islamic Movement of Nigeria 
(IMN) led by Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzaky 
and Ja’amutu Tajidmul Islam led by 
Abubakar Mujahid are other radical 
movements with violent trends. In 
similar ways, the associated grievances 
and struggles are not new in the region: 
underdevelopment, corruption, bad 
governance, unemployment and 
sectarian conflict between Christians 
and Muslims have always been there. 
Finally, arms trafficking, trans-border 
crime, human trafficking, sectarian 
killings and banditry are not recent 
phenomena. What makes Boko Haram 
different? Boko Haram is different 
because it has been able to modernise 
these trends and apply a strategy that 
reflects a certain constituency in the 
global discourse of terrorism.
Counter-terrorism
In response to this trend, Nigeria and 
her allies have committed themselves 
to various counter-terrorism responses. 
Before 2009/2010 when Boko Haram 
commenced its acts of terrorism, the 
development and activities of the 
group was largely policed. With the 
rise in the number of attacks by the 
group, the Nigerian National Assembly 
passed a law that incriminates acts of 
terrorism, the Terrorist Prevention Act 
of 2011 and amended in 2013. Against 
this background, the government 
of Nigeria intensified efforts to end 
Boko Haram terrorism. By late 2011, 
however, Boko Haram bombed the 
UN and Police Headquarters in Abuja 
and threatened the seat of Nigeria’s 
government. As various allies and 
intergovernmental bodies started to 
contemplate their responses, Nigeria 
began the incremental injection of the 
military in their operational responses 
against Boko Haram.
The government of Nigeria has 
thus joined her counterparts in Niger 
and Chad within the framework of the 
Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) 
to patrol common borders against the 
growing trans-nationalisation of Boko 
Haram operations. Within Nigeria, the 
Nigerian Army, the Navy, the Air force, 
State Security Service (SSS) and the 
Police are drawn into the Joint Task Force 
(JTF). Other agencies such as the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Custom and 
Immigration officials, Port and Aviation 
Authorities have been allotted one role 
or the other in the on-going security 
operations. These measures have been 
joined by the Civilian Joint Task Force 
(CJTF), a group of volunteers from 
communities affected by Boko Haram’s 
campaigns of terror. These volunteers 
help the JTF’s operations in gathering 
intelligence and facilitating the arrests 
and killings of Boko Haram members, 
given their familiarity and knowledge 
of the terrain as well as suspected or 
known terrorists in their locality. With 
such arrangements, many Boko Haram 
members have been arrested and 
decapitated.
However, Boko Haram has not 
been deterred by these arrangements. 
On many occasions, the Nigerian 
President, Goodluck Jonathan, 
has declared the infiltration of his 
government and security agencies by 
members of this sect.4 This compromises 
security information and defence 
equipment. It also explains how 
insurgents “get important intelligence 
information on the deployment of 
the military and movement of troops, 
information they have used to good 
effect”5 as well as contributing to 
the insurgents’ forceful conscription 
of about 100 young men in August 
2014 from Doron Baga village in Borno 
State. 
The on-going activities of Boko 
Haram may continue for some time 
as the commissioned military officers 
and Defence Ministry have access to 
large amounts of money to prosecute 
counter-insurgencies. They would 
like to see the continuation of this 
development for financial gains as long 
as the problem is being politicised and 
turned into money spinning by the 
relevant security clusters. Therefore, 
the government has made efforts to 
negotiate with the group and has 
offered amnesty to its members. This 
Despite the  
elaborate responses, 
resources, time and 
energy that countering 
Boko Haram terrorism 
has received, there 
has recently been a 
problem coordinating 
and politicising 
responses.  Commitment 
and support seems to 
be declining at times, 
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measure was vigorously pursued 
between mid-2012 and mid-2013, 
though unsuccessfully. On many 
occasions, Boko Haram has declared 
the unconditional release of their 
imprisoned comrades and the strict 
implementation of Sharia penal code 
in the northern region as the only 
condition for dialogue. But while some 
factions of the group have proven 
to be cooperative in dialogue, the 
leading faction, the Abubarka Shekau 
group, is least moved. Because of 
this intransigence, the government 
of Nigeria has to resort to strategic 
deterrence or to annihilate the 
movement in order to end terrorism in 
the country. 
The government of Nigeria 
moved toward the annihilation of 
terrorists by proscribing Boko Haram 
and Ansaru as terrorist groups. The 
governments of Australia, Canada, 
United Kingdom and the United 
States, and intergovernmental bodies, 
including the European Union and 
the United Nations Security Council 
have responded to the two groups 
with similar proscriptions. In May 2013 
the federal government of Nigeria 
declared a state of emergency in the 
three affected states (Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe states) considered as Boko 
Haram strongholds. This was followed 
by the commissioning of these states for 
counterinsurgency operations under 
the Defence Headquarters. After the 
expiration of this emergency rule that 
lasted six months, the proclamation 
was further renewed by the 
National Assembly on the 
recommendation of the President. 
However, Boko Haram terrorism has 
continued undeterred.
The State Department of the US 
had earlier proscribed Shekau and 
some other leaders of Boko Haram 
as International Terrorists, even 
before the proscription of the group. 
The Department of State offered to 
give $7 million to anyone who could 
provide information on how to track 
down Shekau.6 Israel, the US and 
UK have sent technical experts, arms 
and aid to Nigeria. The UK has even 
joined Nigeria in carrying out some 
special operations, such as hostage 
rescue missions. However, the growing 
number of countries affected due to 
the activities of this sect, including 
business interests and foreign citizens, 
has increased Nigeria’s allies in 
countering terrorism. Transnational 
operations and the connections of 
this group beyond Nigeria’s borders 
has also created reluctant allies such 
as Cameroon and France. The Chibok 
incident has increased the amount 
of counterterrorism aid that Nigeria 
attracts, from China, Israel, EU, 
France, the UK and US. Even with 
this international line-up against them, 
Boko Haram has continued.
Conclusion
Boko Haram operations have 
emerged as one of the growing African 
constituents and expanding frontiers 
of terror.  This trend has also attracted 
global attention. Despite the elaborate 
responses, resources, time and energy 
that countering Boko Haram terrorism 
has received, there has recently been 
a problem coordinating and politicising 
responses.  Commitment and support 
seems to be declining at times, and 
confusion and waywardness are 
common. To counter Boko Haram 
terrorism, however, there is a need 
for internal rearrangements within 
the government, political renewal 
and revitalisation of commitment and 
support systems in Nigeria. At the 
international level, there is a need 
for cooperation, commitment and 
capacity-building, targeting front line 
countries. 
Earlier this year troops from 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger 
claimed to have recaptured some 
areas from Boko Haram in northern 
Nigeria. In March, 2015 the combined 
military forces of Chad and Niger 
drove the Boko Haram rebels from 
the towns of Malam Fatouriv and 
Damasak.
Whilst it is important for military 
victories to be scored in the long-term 
the Nigerian government and its allies 
have to go beyond a military solution. 
As General Martin Luther Agwai, 
Nigeria’s former Chief of Defence staff 
said:  “You can never solve any of these 
problems with military solutions… it is 
a political issue; it is a social issue; it 
is an economic issue, and until these 
issues are addressed, the military can 
never give you a solution.” Buhari, a 
candidate in the upcoming presidential 
elections, has dealt with insecurity 
in Nigeria before. In 1983 he led an 
army unit that drove out Chadian 
rebels who had made incursions over 
the north-eastern Nigerian border. 
In an ironic reversal of fortunes, the 
Chadian army is now helping Nigeria 
to fight Boko Haram insurgents in the 
same corner of Nigeria. In response, 
Buhari has called the current Nigerian 
government’s reliance on assistance 
from a much poorer country like Chad 
a “big disgrace”.7  
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